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The Canadian response to youth crime has not been significantly different from 
the approach taken in other common law jurisdictions. The nature, purpose and 
effectiveness of the youth justice system formed the subject matter of over two 
decades of debate in our country. The reciprocal impact of legislative provisions 
and judicial functions are key components of that debate.
The Young Offenders Act became law on 2 April 1984.1 It replaced the 
Juvenile Delinquents Act2 which had formed the underpinning of the youth justice 
system and remained basically unchanged since its enactment in 1908. The old 
legislation became the target of criticism because it was perceived as incapable of 
fulfilling its promise to protect, treat, and guide young persons. Where treatment 
or help was given, there was fear that it was done at the expense of the youth’s 
legal rights to a fair hearing. In Canada and other jurisdictions, there was concern 
that young persons were, in some cases, receiving the worst of both worlds, an 
informal hearing devoid of due process and no effective treatment.
The Young Offenders Act has not escaped close public scrutiny. The Act has 
been the subject of criticism for its failure to ameliorate the nature of our 
response to youth crime. The new “justice model” has not attracted reactions 
that are significantly more positive than those to its immediate predecessor, the 
“medical model.” Many of the criticisms levelled at the Young Offenders Act, and 
by extension at the present youth court, should be focused on the manner in which 
the legislation has been implemented and the extent to which essential adjunctive 
resources have been provided. It has been suggested that any legislation has both 
an “expressive character” and an “instrumental character.” The former represents 
the values that society aims to protect, and the latter represents the manner in 
which society prosecutes or implements the protection of those values.3
Both the Young Offenders Act and the Juvenile Delinquents Act were expressly 
promulgated under Parliament’s authority to legislate in respect of criminal law 
and procedure. The new legislation has abandoned the omnibus offence of
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delinquency which included acts that were not criminal for adults (for example, 
sexual immorality). The young person is now charged directly under the Criminal 
Code or other federal statutes.4
The instrumental character of the Juvenile Delinquents Act was such that 
judges were expected to act as wise and caring parents. The formalities of 
evidence law and criminal procedure were insignificant compared to the need to 
“straighten out” a child. To that end the juvenile was to be treated “as an 
offender, one in a condition of delinquency, therefore requiring help and guidance 
and proper supervision.”5 The new legislation has in effect divorced the youth 
court from the child welfare court. However, the dispositional powers of the Act 
are not intended to be a substitute for child protection laws.
As a judge, I am increasingly aware that the effects of laws upon citizens, 
particularly young persons, are often determined by other people. The conduct of 
these other persons is determined more by custom, values and attitudes, which, to 
the extent that they can be defined, reflect and help establish the law. However, 
while laws may set out certain rules and guidelines, values are difficult, if not 
impossible, to compartmentalize legally or scientifically. While the law may 
succeed in expressing certain values that require protection, the will to provide the 
means to achieve the expressed goal is often wanting. The failure to inject vital 
resources into the value protection process should not reflect negatively on the 
merits of the latter. Much of the criticism directed at the Young Offenders Act has 
focused on the expressive character of the legislation, with little or no recognition 
of the need to clearly examine society’s collective view of its instrumental 
character.
The problem of youth crime existed prior to the Juvenile Delinquents Act, and 
while different in nature, still exists despite the Young Offenders Act. If youth 
crime may be characterized as a phenomenon, then I venture to say the Young 
Offenders Act can be viewed as an epiphenomenon. In turn, the Juvenile 
Delinquents Act was the epiphenomenon to the phenomenon of youth crime prior 
to 1984. Society’s legislative response to crime in both cases represents a 
secondary and companion situation. Neither the Juvenile Delinquents Act nor the 
Young Offenders Act should be perceived as realistic and effective solutions to the 
problem of crime. Nor should the court be seen as the solution. The legislation 
and the court process must be combined with other societal components if they 
are to be effective at all. The Young Offenders Act was not designed, and should 
not be perceived as having been designed, to effectively transform the youth court
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into the emergency or treatment ward, or worse still, the catholicon for all social 
ills.
The problem of crime, which has plagued societies for years, can be 
approached from different points of view. We can look at the philosophies of how 
to deal with problem people6 or we can look at the situation empirically, that is 
the problem itself or the offence.7 Each of the approaches is legitimate, and most 
people are unlikely to be easily persuaded of the relative superiority of either 
approach. Suffice to say that the Young Offenders Act has provided an opportunity 
to re-examine these and other similar issues. This review is an opportunity to 
balance the competing theories and approaches. In re-examining these issues, it 
is particularly important to consider the different characteristics of the various 
stages of a youth’s involvement in the court system, especially during adjudication 
and disposition.
As a judge, I remind myself that the youths that I see as alleged or actual 
offenders are but the tip of the “youthful conduct iceberg.” Most young persons 
do antisocial acts. Not all of them get caught and most do not realize the impact 
of their actions upon victims. Should all young persons who do antisocial acts be 
the subject of criminal charges? The more serious cases may very well be 
exceptions and not the rule. Perhaps the problem should be viewed generally 
rather than focusing on the exceptional or sensational cases. If murder and 
manslaughter charges represent less than 1% of the charges against young persons, 
what significance does this have for society’s attribution of such offences to a faulty 
or deficient piece of legislation?8
The Young Offenders Act abandoned the concept of the all-embracing offence 
of delinquency. Parliament’s primary concern, expressed in the legislation, is now 
with the criminal conduct of young persons and not that of protection or child 
welfare. Protection of the child’s welfare is duly enshrined in provincial and 
territorial civil legislation. The distinction between these two objectives, coupled 
with a clear recognition of due process of young persons, is consistent with, and 
in some areas stronger than, the rights provided under the Charter9 While some 
may lament the passing of the informal proceedings under the Juvenile Delinquents 
Act, the fundamental concept of fairness dictates that any person charged with a 
criminal offence should have recourse to a system that respects individual rights. 
No person should be pressured into an admission of guilt by well-meaning
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individuals who believe the alleged offender could benefit from supervision, 
guidance and treatment.
A finding of guilt in a youth court should not necessarily be the only condition 
for entry into a treatment centre or specialized programme of care and education. 
There are still too many situations where minor charges are laid for the purpose 
of connecting a protection-type youth to the process and resources of the Young 
Offenders Act. Mental health and child welfare proceedings should be the 
appropriate response. There are situations where I wish the court had the 
jurisdiction to suspend Young Offender proceedings, and, with minimum delay, 
transform or transfer the matter directly into a protection hearing.
Some have argued that the Young Offenders Act and due process have in fact 
stifled the possibility of informal resolution of conflicts. Section 4 of this Act has, 
on the contrary, clearly recognized that issues relating to alleged offences need not 
be formally dealt with in the court process. This legislative alternative to the 
judicial process has either not been implemented, or implemented in a minimal 
or restrictive manner. Surely this non-implementation is not a frailty of the Act? 
While the exercise of prosecutorial discretion varies considerably from region to 
region, this variation is no more a reflection of the weakness of the Act than is the 
unavailability of community resources to ensure early identification and 
intervention. Greater accessibility to alternative measures would enable the court 
to concentrate on the more serious or contested charges in a timely fashion. The 
professional training and development of persons participating in the investigation, 
prosecution, defence and disposition of young offender cases is essential for the 
proper administration of youth justice. Any deficiencies in that area, regardless 
of their root causes, cannot be attributed to the nature and character of the 
legislation.
The Young Offenders Act, like its predecessor, provides for the possibility of 
a transfer to an adult court in exceptional cases. The exceptional case is usually 
that of murder or attempted murder. Young persons found guilty in youth court 
of first or second degree murder are now subject to a maximum of five years less 
a day. The period of custody remains a maximum of three years, but an additional 
period of conditional supervision is provided. Amendments to the Criminal Code 
provide that when a young person is convicted of murder after a transfer to adult 
court, he or she will be eligible for parole after serving five to ten years of the 
sentence, rather than the ten to twenty-five years that applied before.
The new standard in transfer applications requires the court to consider the 
interest of society, which includes the objectives of affording protection to the 
public and rehabilitation of the young person. If the two objectives cannot be 
reconciled, the court is required to order the transfer because protection of the 
public is paramount. While difficulties in the interpretation of these competing
objectives may not disappear under the new provisions, it is safe to assert that 
confusion and ambivalence should be greatly reduced in the future.
Transfer applications signal situations where the youth justice system is 
perceived as being inadequate or inappropriate given the circumstances of a case. 
Should this be necessary? Should not a separate youth justice system be such that 
it is capable of responding to all cases involving youthful offenders? The time, 
energy and resources spent on transfer hearings themselves may outweigh the costs 
of administrative, practical and adjunctive service reforms necessary to develop 
such a complete and comprehensive youth court system.
Aside from the practical difficulties, I see a philosophical or conceptual 
problem with the idea of transfers. The exercise is essentially a sentencing 
proceeding, but it is done prior to a finding of guilt. The evidence before the 
court is essentially hearsay. The nature of the offence, the circumstances 
surrounding its commission, medical and psychological reports and pre-disposition 
concerning the accused, are all presented in the context of an artificial proceeding.
One of the most cherished principles of our criminal common law is that an 
accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. However, in a transfer 
hearing the troublesome and rather schizophrenic “presumed innocent, but 
assumed guilty” approach is often used. There is an assumption that the Crown 
will be able to prove the alleged offence at trial. However, history has clearly 
shown that evidence subsequently called, admitted or proven at trial will not 
always substantiate the alleged offence. The result may be a finding of guilt on 
a lesser offence or an acquittal.
Assuming a successful prosecution, a traditional sentencing hearing involves 
the consideration of such elements as the following: the facts found by the court, 
the accused’s character, background and feelings towards the victim, expressions 
of remorse or lack thereof, willingness to change and participate in restitution 
programmes, and so forth. The person preparing reports for a transfer hearing 
must respect the youth’s fundamental right to silence and his or her right against 
self-incrimination. It is difficult to reconcile the process of transfer with the 
traditional principles of due process and judicial responsibility. This difference is 
over and above the practical dilemma of attempting to determine the appropriate 
sentencing forum on the basis of incomplete and potentially inaccurate factual 
situations.
If we must maintain a form of “safety valve” for exceptional cases, perhaps we 
might consider dealing with the issue of transfer to an adult court after a finding 
of guilt. I recognize the need to examine practical, legislative and perhaps 
constitutional factors, but surely that is no longer foreign to us.
The range of dispositional powers conferred upon the court by the Young 
Offenders Act is quite broad. The discretion of the court and others responsible 
for the execution of particular dispositions has been narrowed. Custodial 
dispositions are time-limited, and this too is perceived by some as being inimical 
to the traditional treatment-oriented philosophy of the youth court. On the other 
hand, some perceive the general increase in custodial dispositions as a reflection 
of society’s and the court’s increased punitive attitude. That a young person 
should have the right to refuse treatment, which is perceived to be in his or her 
interest, is a source of concern. For many, the maximum disposition for serious 
crimes is still problematic and proof that the Act is the primary cause of youth 
crime in our country.
The number and nature of dispositions under the Young Offenders Act, 
compared to those under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, must be examined in the 
context of their respective societal and systemic climates. The nature and 
frequency of the offences, the characteristics of the offender, and the alternatives 
available are all significant. However, realistic and reliable comparisons are very 
difficult. While custodial dispositions may have increased under the Young 
Offenders Act, they are generally of a shorter nature. The frequency of serious 
offences has risen, as has the involvement of female youth in these grave and 
violent offences. Just as importantly, custodial dispositions under the Young 
Offenders Act include many open facilities that were unavailable to the court 
before the Act (except as Children’s Aid foster homes). I recall that after having 
succeeded in the enactment of an open-detention category prior to trial, some 
authorities pleaded with judges to re-examine the increased tendency to detain. 
The simple fact was that judges were more likely to order detention because they 
knew that often meant a community group home and not a secure institution.
I suggest that it might have been more realistic, and certainly less confusing, 
to ensure better alternatives to detention in the form of release on bail with 
specific conditions. The public, and particularly the youth and family, could better 
understand what was happening. You are either in or out, but the degree to which 
your liberty is affected while out on bail could vary. However, it was deemed 
more appropriate to categorize the degree of detention and make it such that 
some allegedly “detained” youth are basically no more detained than the average 
resident of a Children’s Aid Society group home.
Frequently judges are asked by administrative authorities to recommend secure 
pre-trial detention in some cases. I normally refuse, politely reminding them that 
this was precisely the type of discretion that they wished to keep from the judge. 
It is interesting to note that the judicial discretion to determine the level of 
custody at the dispositional stage has been questioned. Perhaps the court will 
again be invited to recommend the level of custody in particular cases to provide
insurance against an administrative decision that might subsequently prove 
embarrassing.
Dispositions under the Young Offenders Act tend to reflect the emphasis on 
the offence and its characteristics more than those under the Juvenile Delinquents 
Act. Under the latter the characteristics of the delinquent youth dominated. 
Simple comparisons of the overall use rates of particular dispositions, without 
regard to such factors as the changed characteristics of the cases themselves, the 
screening of cases before court and the mix of offences on which youths are found 
guilty, are not particularly meaningful. While there may be a demonstrated change 
in philosophy or approach at the dispositional stage, I am not persuaded that it 
reflects an increased severity. It is certainly not the public’s perception.
The discrepancies that occur in dispositions reflect the nature of the principles 
enunciated in the Act. They are also consistent with the perennial problem of 
sentencing. One reason that sentencing is often perceived as the most difficult 
judicial task is that, over and above the variability and complexity of the cases, 
society itself has difficulty defining exactly what it expects from the court. The 
traditional principles of sentencing in adult cases may be applied differently by 
different judges in similar fact situations. Such variation is potentially greater 
under the Young Offenders Act because, over and above the traditional principle 
of sentencing, there are other sometimes contradictory goals placed before the 
judge. For example, the youth’s requirements of supervision, discipline, control, 
assistance, and guidance are sometimes in conflict with protecting society from 
illegal behaviour. There is also the goal that young persons should bear 
responsibility for their crimes, but not be held accountable in the same manner or 
suffer the same consequences as adults. It remains to be seen whether the dual 
objectives incorporated into the “interest of society” standard recently articulated 
for transfer hearings will be reflected in dispositions.
My main objective as a judge should be an appropriate and fair disposition 
which will hopefully:
(1) help to rehabilitate the offender and ensure that he or she becomes more 
productive, stable and law-abiding,10
(2) reflect the least restrictive alternative, and
(3) ensure society’s interest in justice, peace and safety, having regard to the 
appropriate balancing the principles of the Act.
To accomplish this the court requires access to a wide variety of resources. The 
disparities and inadequate dispositions are often a function of the lack of
10I recognize that to speak of rehabilitation, to some extent at least, presupposes a prior state of 
habilitation.
appropriate resources. Even if we were to arrive at near perfection in legislation, 
the expressed goals would be meaningless without the instrumental means with 
which to accomplish the desired tasks.
Many youths found guilty of offences may, nonetheless, function in the 
community while responding to the court’s disposition of their case. Others, 
despite a wide array of community alternatives, may need confinement with or 
without treatment. As a judge, I am mindful that I can virtually guarantee 
punishment, but I cannot guarantee treatment. Over and above the uncertain state 
of the art, including its ultimate efficacy, treatment can mean different things to 
different people. Even if a youth consents to treatment, what assurance can the 
court and youth have that the promised treatment will be provided? “A young 
offender would be a fool to consent to help when he knows he can’t get it.”11
Ideally, a disposition should be seen as fair by the offender, the victim and the 
community. The Young Offenders Act, which espouses the justice model, is 
superior to its predecessor. This due-process model facilitates a more realistic 
examination of such factors as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the views 
of the victim, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, the 
views of the offender, and his or her history and background. Due process:
permits the opportunity to introduce one small piece of clarity and concreteness
and thus may lead toward reduction of confusion, ambivalence and inconsistency
by dealing with the events rather than the dynamics.12
The Young Offenders Act is regrettably perceived by some as having ineffective 
and simplistic solutions to, and therefore the undisputed cause of, the complex and 
multifaceted problem of crime. The focus must re-adjusted onto society’s response 
to the need for community based preventive and treatment resources. These are 
necessary adjuncts to the legislation.
Our social and economic situation is such that we can hardly expect a 
reduction in youth crime. Social institutions, particularly schools, need the 
resources to identify persons at risk and intervene at an earlier stage. Inter-agency 
collaboration is desperately needed to ensure that intervention is coupled with, and 
not separate from, treatment resources. Where prevention and alternatives to the 
formal process are unsuccessful, collaboration in the system must replace the 
“turfitus” which saps the initiative of many dedicated persons and accounts for the 
duplication of some resources and the unavailability of others. There must be on­
going evaluation of existing programmes, and timely sharing of research data. 
None of these factors have much to do with the legislation. Crozier, a
n R. Meen, “Due Process: the Search Progress” (Address to the Conference on the Young Offenders
Act, Toronto, 5 May 1987) [unpublished] at 3.
distinguished French sociologist, explored the crisis of modern, industrial society 
and suggested some strategies for social change. In The Stalled Society he states:
A society’s capacity for action, its ability to reveal its own problems, to discover 
solutions to them and to put those solutions into effect, and its aptitude for 
innovation, all depend essentially on its established resources. Formal or informal 
institutions are the instruments of human co-operation. There can be no more 
exalted talk than to be concerned in their development. Imagination is not enough 
here. We must summon up other virtues whose intellectual qualities have long 
been forgotten, of which the most important are patience and courage.13
The Juvenile Delinquents Act had its flaws and the Young Offenders Act is not 
perfect, but we are making progress. The tradition of the juvenile court has left 
its mark in many positive respects. The blending of theory and experience with 
those of the other social sciences is imperative. As a judge I must be more than 
a legal technician. Law alone is incompetent to dictate an appropriate and 
adequate disposition. There is a need for informed and open collaboration in the 
prevention, prosecution and resolution of antisocial and criminal conduct. Funding 
hassles, professional jealousies, duplication of services and resources, and lack of 
co-operation must be challenged, reduced and eventually eradicated. The sound 
principles and goals expressed in the legislation will otherwise be at risk of 
becoming shallow shibboleths.
My effectiveness as a youth court judge may be affected by the legislation. But 
it is much more likely to be affected by the availability of human and material 
resources, which are the sine qua non of fulfilling the promise of the legislation.
13M. Crozier, The Stalled Society (New York: Viking Press, 1973) at 177.
